Italy's constitutional court reshapes 'Jure Sanguinis'

Italy’s Constitutional Court has ushered in a new chapter in the debate over citizenship by descent, but contrary to sensational headlines, it has not abolished jure sanguinis.

In 2025, the Italian government introduced sweeping reforms to citizenship by descent, commonly referred to as the “Tajani decree,” named after Foreign Minister Antonio Tajani. The reforms followed years of political concern over the rapid growth of jure sanguinis claims from descendants of Italian emigrants across the globe.

Under Italy’s previous framework, citizenship was recognised through ancestors several generations removed, provided the citizenship line remained uninterrupted. Authorities argued the system had become administratively unsustainable, with consulates overwhelmed by applicants who often had limited practical ties to Italy. The reforms sharply narrowed eligibility, generally limiting recognition to descendants with an Italian parent or grandparent while imposing stricter procedural requirements.

Italy’s Constitutional Court has upheld the reforms as constitutionally valid, prompting headlines declaring the “end” of Italian citizenship by descent.

But as a constitutional lawyer who is assisting Italian communities abroad in citizenship litigation, I believe the ruling has been widely misunderstood. Rather than settling the issue, the Court has fundamentally reshaped the legal framework while leaving several critical questions unresolved.

For millions of descendants of Italian emigrants, jure sanguinis represents more than an administrative entitlement. It reflects family history, cultural identity and enduring ties to Italy. Historically, Italian citizenship by descent was treated as a status acquired automatically at birth, with consulates and courts merely recognising it as an existing legal condition.

The Constitutional Court adopted a different interpretation, treating citizenship not as an automatic birthright, but as a “potential” status that only fully exists once formally recognised.

This distinction is crucial. If citizenship exist at birth, retroactive restrictions could amount to stripping individuals of citizenship they already possess. If citizenship instead remains a potential entitlement, Parliament arguably has greater authority to redefine eligibility rules before recognition is completed.

In my reading of the judgment, this reinterpretation is the ruling’s true turning point. It reframes how Italian courts may approach descendants born abroad who had not yet completed the recognition process before the 2025 reforms entered into force.

One of the most contentious unresolved questions concerns applicants who attempted to begin the citizenship process before March 2025 but were unable to secure appointments through Italy’s overwhelmed consular system. The Constitutional Court acknowledged that issue remained unresolved because it fell outside the scope of the original constitutional challenge.

That omission may prove decisive for thousands of applicants worldwide.

For years, the consular booking platform Prenot@mi became synonymous with frustration. Calendars were inaccessible, appointments disappeared instantly and waiting periods stretched into years. Many applicants argue they were effectively prevented from filing claims despite actively attempting to do so.

The Constitutional Court recognised that a distinction may exist between applicants who took concrete steps toward recognition and those who remained entirely inactive. That issue emerged directly in cases I have handled on behalf of descendants of Italian emigrants abroad.

Earlier this year, the Tribunal of Bologna accepted that one of my clients had clearly demonstrated the intention to seek Italian citizenship despite being unable to secure an official consular appointment. In May 2026, the same court recognised citizenship for another two of my clients, a US-born applicant and his daughter, after finding they had already activated the recognition process before the March 27, 2025 cutoff through documented communications with consular offices, certified email submissions and a legal mandate signed before the reforms took effect.

The Bologna court drew an important distinction between applicants who remained inactive and those who had taken concrete, documented steps toward recognition. In some respects, I believe this reasoning is narrower than the opening left by the Constitutional Court, which appeared to suggest that the key distinction lies more broadly between inactivity and activation.

The Bologna rulings must also be understood within the Constitutional Court’s framework. I respect that decision and recognise that lower courts remain bound by it. I do not, however, share its reasoning.

In my view, the Constitutional Court has re-characterised Italian citizenship by descent—from a status long described in Italian jurisprudence as acquired at birth—into something closer to a contingent right capable of being extinguished retroactively if procedural recognition had not occurred before March 27, 2025.

Another major battleground now lies at the European level.

Italy’s Constitutional Court dismissed European Union citizenship case law as irrelevant in this context, reasoning that individuals without formal recognition do not yet possess a legally certain status as EU citizens. Yet the ultimate authority on questions of European citizenship belongs to the Court of Justice of the European Union.

European jurisprudence has repeatedly held that while member states control nationality laws, they cannot exercise those powers in ways that undermine the protections attached to EU citizenship. Critics argue the “Tajani decree” may struggle to satisfy those standards because it applies retroactively to broad categories of descendants born abroad without individual assessment.

In analysing these reforms, I have also referred to the German legal concept of Etikettenschwindel, or “label fraud.” In my view, the law avoids expressly declaring that citizenship is being revoked by instead asserting that certain descendants never acquired citizenship at all. Yet for generations Italian law treated citizenship by descent as original, permanent and imprescriptible. Changing the terminology may not alter the practical effect.

Despite the Constitutional Court’s ruling, the broader conflict over Italian citizenship by descent remains unresolved. Cases involving applicants who attempted to act before the 2025 deadline continue before Italian courts, and future referrals to the Court of Justice of the European Union appear increasingly likely.

For descendants of Italians abroad, this debate extends far beyond administrative procedure. It concerns identity, belonging and the historical relationship between Italy and its global diaspora. Jure sanguinis has not disappeared, but it has entered an uncertain legal era.